The Egyptian saga is not over, far from it. Mubarak, clinically dead, used to say "it is me or the bearded ones". We got the bearded ones but the situation remains volatile. Their majority is slim and the army is trying to pull the rug out from under their political agenda. The initiators of the Tahrir Square movement feel, rightly so, betrayed by two camps which stand for the status quo (the army) or for the stone age (the Brotherhood). The inglorious finale of Mubarak, whatever his faults might have been reminds me of the fall of the Shah. Those episodes do not show their former backers in a flattering light. They blundered, shifting froem the abrupt to the circumlocutory, loosing an ally ,while forgetting to have an understudy ready to step in.
Egypt is still the motor of the Arab world and any fundamental change there has repercussions from Turkey to Morocco. Hence a situation now wherein the instability and a murky future create a danger zone with multiple possible repercussions in geopolitics, military strategy and democracy (if such an outcome could still be envisaged in an Islamic context.) The Muslim Brotherhood has a long history which predates the coup of Nasser, who was basically more a pan-Arabist ideologue than a narrow-minded fanatic. After the revolution, the Brotherhood became more an underground force than a player in the political arena. Mubarak had his good side--in international affairs--and a less-pleasant side in his handling of internal affairs of a country which he considered as his private domain. His entourage reaped the benefits, while the masses survived on subventions for elementary needs and foodstuffs. Here the Muslim Brotherhood found allies who were ignored in their own country or discouraged to go to the Red Sea resorts, which were reserved for Western tourists who could enjoy cocktails, sex, service and sunbathing without censure. For those who risked leaving the classical tourist trails, there opened a vision of a country which was polluted, dirty, ignored by the gated communities reserved for the rich. Poor Egyptians lived in de facto Bantoustans where the regime was considered an American creation. Mubarak, who showed such cleverness in his analysis of international affairs (in the first place the Palestinian question, Israel or Iran), showed little empathy with a population which was hidden from him by a screen of sycophants, who got richer by the day.
It is also difficult to predict what tomorrow will bring because you have three constituencies who are equally frustrated. The military wants to cut its losses, the Islamists do not want to give up the added value of a (narrow) electoral victory, and the secular element which brought Mubarak to his downfall will do the impossible for the clock not be turned back. All the elements for a vicious confrontation are ready for ignition and a Syrian repeat should not be excluded. Such a scenario would be difficult to contain. Other countries not in the vicinity would certainly use "proxis" to steer an outcome which should not jeopardize specific interests. The Suez (Suicide) Canal is of vital importance and the risk of having Suez and Ormuz in unwelcome hands is too great to be ignored. .
The Russians are playing with fire in Syria. We should keep our matches dry and look into a diplomatic compromise. The Turkish model might be acceptable to all if there is still enough value left in Egypt which can be considered an asset rather than a liability. Unfortunately, the Arabs are often their own worst enemies, seemingly unable to confront diversity and modernity. Egypt risks loosing a historic opportunity. This would be all the more tragic since there was, until World War II, a parliamentary tradition and a plurality of opinion. Like most things Egyptian, this also risks being covered by the sand, which in this fascinating country is the only dynasty with lasting power.
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