The Navy commando raid that killed Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan was supposed to bring closure to an event that changed the world forever. The brain behind this catastrophic Götterdamerung ended his perplexing life as a lonely man, living in a rather squalid dwelling, finally killed after a decade of frustrating search. The coda to the 9/11 tragedy could not have been more mediocre, almost pathetic. The most wanted man in the world was returned to his natural habitat, oblivion.
The clean-up operation in the compound which followed showed further that there is no correlation between a sophisticated terrorist attack and the surprisingly meager means that led to its ultimate devastating success. The detection of a simple human courier led to the discovery of the hiding-place of Bin Laden, which was primitive to the core. Likewise, Ayman al–Zawahri, Anwar al-Awlaki (American and probably the most vicious of the lot) and Co. will not waste time in mundane or intellectual pursuits. Al Qaeda is a fanatical, nihilistic grouping which does not want to be distracted from its Islamo-fascist agenda. Like the Taliban they do not shed tears for their fallen, who increase the number of martyrs in their paranoid logbook of gains and losses.
9/11 still carries potential unforeseeable consequences. It happened at a time when the West was still operating in a post-Cold War mode. The deterrence was macro-shaped and not adapted to deal with this new strand of warfare. The past valid concepts which we were used to were buried under the remains of the twin towers. The reaction worldwide was therefore one of disbelief. While the American administration and President George W. Bush were able to galvanize the emotions, they erred, understandably so, in their political vocabulary. They magnified the tragedy. They failed to focus on the surreal underlining reality of this Jihadist suicidal network which dared to launch a clockwork attack against the first world power. Later on, the real (in numbers/capacities) dimension - equally toxic -of the terrorist threat became clear. The modest numbers in “organized” terrorist groups did not diminish the lurking danger of future bites of the scorpion.
It is redundant to return to the events and miscalculations which triggered the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is revealing to see how the military and political concepts have since evolved. Old strategies became irrelevant, costly, and in the end, self defeating. The US will not leave Iraq or Afghanistan with flying colors. Sound bites such as “war of terror” and “axis of evil” belong more to a World War II narrative than to the current hybrid situations, which proliferate underground, devoid of any qualitative strategy or endgame besides a hatred of Western concepts. Meanwhile we use weaponry and manpower against them which might as well be used to attack the moon and which are mismatched, considering the ways in which they operate. Lately, the use of new deterrence, be it drones, financial sleuthing, hacking, commando raids or hot cyber pursuit, has changed the picture. Likewise, the vocabulary has been streamlined to reduce the impact of an unavoidable withdrawal from Afghanistan and to corner the Jihadists in the moral prison of their own making. Violent extremism is with us to stay, be it outside or home-grown. The United States and Europe must come up with a new concept of their common interests. They need to target more micro-interventions and come up with a means of detection of what remains a folly dressed as a holy war.
Afghanistan might return to its pre-historic roots and tribal rules. This is too bad but the West (especially under the present economic conditions) cannot continue to waste its energy and creativity in nation-building in countries, tribal areas and hellholes where the believers hold sway. It does not sound nice or altruistic but when a body rejects the implanted organ, therapeutic overdosing becomes wasteful. Our principles of deterrence must include the notion of “neglect” as a possible strategic alternative for the future. Maybe we should return to some of the ideas of George Kennan and apply them to those new outlaws who appear and seemingly multiply. Sometimes we have to isolate rather than to engage. We should use ways and means to implant a chip of distrust in their midst, which could activate a sense of insecurity amongst Jihadists, and make it more difficult for them to raise money and to plot. Certain websites need to be made unpredictable so that they hesitate to enter the web. In their psyche they fear humiliation, they don’t fear death.
The so-called Arab Spring further complicates the future. The asymmetric response of the West is unconvincing but there is no other alternative. It rattles current allies and starts to wake-up Arab political might but leaves Israel dangerously exposed. It is very naïve to confuse the unrest in the Arab world with a thirst for enlightenment. The contrary might very well happen.
The European Union has to share the burden in what is de facto its Hinterland. It looks too often as if we run after the events rather than prepare various scenarios for changes which have seldom anything in common besides a rejection of the existing status quo. With the exception of a very shaky religious cover (and its “subdivisions”), the Arabs only share mutual loathing. Their opportunistic solidarity only comes to life when they are directly confronted with the “infidel”. There is no there there. Hence, it is better to stay away from the daily slaughter which is becoming the “plat du jour” for the southern shores of the Mediterranean. At all cost one has to avoid a repeat of the “Shah scenario” which could lead to catastrophic consequences, especially for Israel but also for some ”imposed” allies such as the Gulf States or Saudi Arabia. The Jewish state, with which the West has its differences for sure, is fully entitled to expect our unconditional support in case of aggression.
To return to Al Qaeda, it is certain that the mother of all evils no longer stands alone and that splinter groups are active in various geographical hideouts, creating a further complication for a coherent deterrence. The need for intelligence gathering and sharing is bigger than ever. It is to be hoped that NATO will muster the means and the technology that are needed. President Obama must find his leadership voice again. The echo of his Cairo speech is already overtaken by events. The times of the megaphone of President Bush are equally over. We have a clearer overview both of the danger and of our own limitations. We had better switch from an intrusive strategy to a variable, flexible approach which confronts anti-diluvial enemies with contemporary, more micro-manageable means and a refreshed analytical evaluation. In doing so we must also avoid desubjectifying “the other”. In falling into this trap we would risk creating our own copycat version of what we fight against. Ostracism should never be part of a Western “modus operandi”.
There is one more socio-behavioral-linked fact to bar in mind which has not received enough attention. Europeans have allowed large numbers of Arabs to immigrate. These new arrivals find themselves in culture shock and alienation. They feel uncomfortable in a secular, for them unwelcoming, environment. The consequential result is the creation of clusters. The latter tend to become ghettos wherein the less-desirable individuals blend more successfully. Paradoxically, this makes it somewhat easier for “intelligence” to monitor them. If they operate out of their own familiar territory, they become easily invisible and eminently dangerous, because they feel less stressed, not being burdened with the need to look over their shoulders. Bin Laden might have become less vigilant while operating in a familiar environment.
All this proves that it is never too late to learn from ”The Art of War” by Sun Tzu. Sometimes it looks as if the Chinese, contrary to their Western counterparts, have always been adept in the consideration of all eventualities.
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